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Article 5

NOTES ON RECENT CASES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.-Pardon Power of Governor
for Direct Contempt of Court.-The petitioner was sentenced
for direct contempt of court and the governor issued to him a
pardon which the sheriff refused to recognize on the ground
that it was beyond the power of the executive whereupon the
petitioner brought in habeas corpus. The only question presented was whether the power to pardon for direct contempt of
court is conferred upon a governor under the provisions of the
state constitution which reads: "Subject to such regulations as
may be prescribed by law, the governor shall have power to
grant reprieves and pardons, after conviction, for all offenses except treason and in case of impeachment." The supreme court
of New MAxico held, that such power is within the provisions conferring upon the governor the power of pardon. Ex Parte Magee
(N. M. 1925) 242 Pac. 332.
This is probably the first case
in the United States, as pointed out in briefs, to decide that
a direct contempt of court, committed by words addressed to the
judge, may be pardoned under such a clause. Parker, C. 3. remarks, "It is sometimes said that, if a governor may pardon an
offense of this kind, the independence of the judiciary as a coordinate branch of the government may be destroyed; that a
governor may from persofial or political bias or hatred or fiom
mistaken sense of duty, absolutely destroy the power and usefulness of any court in the state. The answer to this .suggestion
is manifold. In the first place, no assumption can be indulged
that a governor will ever so violate his oath, and so far depart
from his duty, as to be guilty of such conduct. In the next place,
if such a calamity should ever befall the state, the remedy is by
impeachment if the conduct should be flagrant, or by retirement
by the vote of the people at the next election. Again, the
proposition that the three departments of the state government
are independent of each other is only relatively, and not absolutely, true .... The power to punish for contempt in cases like
the present is exercised under the sting of insult, and human nature may not always be able to withstand such stress without losture the poise and calm judgment so necessary to the proper ex-
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ercise of judicial power." The opinion of the supreme court of
the United States in Ex Parte Grossinaun 267 U. S. 87, 45 Sup Ct.
332, 69 L. Ed. 527, 38 A. L. R. 131, seems to be controlling in the
principal case. In that Grossman was sentenced for constriwtive
criminal contempt in violating an injunction against the sale of
liquor. He was pardoned by the President and it was held that
the Constitution gave such power. Chief Justice Taft favored
the exercise of such power as a check upon the arbitrary power
of a judge. The authorities, generally hold that a contempt of
court is an offense against the state rather than against the
judge, and thus comes under the power to pardon for offenses against
the state. In re Madke, 17 Fed. Case No. 9,911; It re Mason, 43
Fed. 510, State v. Souvinet (La.) 13 Am. Rep. 115. Texas, however, has held that a contempt proceeding does not come within the
purview of "criminal cases" which the governor has been given power
to pardon. Taylor v. Goodrich (Tex. Cir. App.) 40 S. W. 515.
The pardon power of an executive does not extend to contempt arising out of a civil suit for the benefit of the parties. In re Nevitt,
117 Fed. 448. Where a governor under the constitution has power
to pardon for all offenses, the power extends. only to offenses in violation of state laws, and the executive has no power to remit a penalty imposed for violation of a city ordinance. State ex rel. Kansas
City v. Renick (Mo.) 57 S. W. 713. The pardoning power, whether
exercised under the federal or state constitution, is the same in its
nature an effect as that exercised by the representatives of the English Crown in this country in colonial times. 29 Cyc. 1563, N. 20;
People z,.
Bowen, (Cal.). 43 Cal. 439, 13 Am. Rep. 148; E. Parte
Pos'ell (Ala.) 49 Am. Rep. 71.
CONTRACTS-To Reveal Undiscovered Assets of Estate.
-The plaintiff, a step-brother of the testatrix, under whose will
defendant was sole beneficiary, knew that the deceased up until
her death had a certificate of deposit in a certain bank but did not
know the amount until after distribution of the estate. Plaintiff
told the executor that there was money unaccounted for belonging to the estate and the executor told him to see the defendant
about it. Defendant agreed, under seal, that in consideration of
revealing the place where the money was, he would pay plaintiff
one-half said sum. Plaintiff gave the information, and defend-
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ant collected the sum from the bank but refused to share with
plaintiff as he agreed whereupon plaintiff brought this action
to recover. Held, that a contract to reveal undiscovered assets of a
decedent estate is not contrary to public policy where plaintiff Was
under no obligation to disclose his knowledge as to the existence of
such tindiscovered assets, and had not performed any acts concerning
it nor caused it to be secreted. Kaplan v. Suher (Mass. 1926) 150
N. E. 9. Commenting on the aspects of the case involved the
court draws somewhat of an analogy between an agreement to pay
for the information of this sort and an offer to pay an award to anyone of the public who may divulge information desired. It is pointed out that where one complies with the terms of a public offer of a
reward for specific information it has been generally held that he
may recover,-citing-fenkins v. Kilbren, 74 Am. Dec. 596; Besse v.
Slyer, 85 Am. Dec. 747; 1 Williston on Contracts, section 33.
EXPLOSIVES.-Liability for Sale.--Defendant company
sold illuminating oil to retailer from whom plaintiff purchased a
quantity which proved inferior, and dangerous in that it was of
lower "flash" test than permitted by Burn's Ann. Statutes, 1914,
Sec. 7888, 7907. Held, it is no defense in an action by consumer
that defendant had no knowledge of its dangerous condition when
it, was sold to the retailers; and it is not necessary that privity of
contract exist between the company selling illuminating oil and a consumer purchasing from a retailer in order to render the .company
liable for damages from an explosion. Standard Oil Co. v. Robb,
( d. App.) 1925. 149 N. E. 567.
GARNISHMENT.-Liability of Common Carrier When
Shipper is in One State and Shipment is in Another.-As a general, and so far as can be found, the universal, rule it has been
determined that a common carrier is not liable to garnishment in
respect to goods which are beyond the territorial limits of the
court issuing the prpcess. 10 C. J. 283. Perhaps the leading
case expounding this rule is Bates v. Chicago, Milwaukee and St.
Paul Ry., 60 Wis. 296, 50 Am. Rep. 369, 19 N. IV. 72. A notice
of garnishment had been served on the carrier for goods in its
possession then in transit from Milwaukee to Chicago. The
court held that the railway could not be enjoined from delivering the goods in Chicago, and neither would it have been pos-

THE NOTRE DAME LAWYER

sible to arrest the goods in transit, even while the goods were
in fact still in Wisconsin. To compel the carrier to hold the
goods in another state would be to extend the power of a court
beyond its limits of jurisdiction, which is an encroachment never
intended; and to arrest the shipment would be to interfere with
the prime duty of carriers-to transport safely goods from one
point to another. To favor one shipper the consignments of
many others would be delayed, and confusion would result. 8 Am.
& Eng. Encyc. 1159.
Bates v. Railway is cited approvingly in 28 L. R. A. 600, and the
principle is even extended. In the latter case the goods, consigned from West Superior, Wisconsin, to St. Paul, Minnesota,
had not left West Superior when the notice of garnishment was
served. As the consignment was on a siding ready to be transported, however, the court found that they could justifiably be
considered in transit, and therefore refused to hold the garnishee
defendant.
In accord with these cases are Ill. Central Ry. v. Cobb, 48 Ill.
402; Western Ry.'Co. v. Thornton, 60 Ga. 300; Stevenson v. Eastern Ry., 40 N. W. 705. All of these cases are adjudged on the theory
that garnishment would be an unwarrantable *extension of the
court's powers into a foreign jurisdiction.
INFANTS.-Incpafty to Con.tract.-Pl'aintiff, a minor
wife, bought furniture of the value of five hundred dollars, to
carry on the business of keeping roomers as a separate undertaking, the husband taking no part in, nor approving of the venture. The young wife bought under a conditional sales agreement and gave a note in her own name. After she had kept
roomers for a few months, she separated from her husband
and while still a minor, repudiated the contract for the purchase
of the furniture, tendered the return of the said furniture, and
demanded the money she had paid. Held, plaintiff could repudiate
and recover, and the fact that she was engaged in a business of trade
does nat remove the incapacity to contract generally, nor can purchases be made in the course of trade be regarded as necessaries.
Wallace v. Newdale Furniture Co., (Wis. 1925) 205 N. AV. 819.
The fact that an infant represents himself to be of full age does not
render this contract valid, nor will it estop him from avoiding the
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contract. Carpenter v. Carpenter, 45 Ind. 142. The rule stated
in the principal case is too well ,ettled to require further comment. *
INNKEEPERS.-Liability for Injuries Caused by Guest's
Negligence. Plaintiff while seated in his automobile parked on
the street in front of the William Penn Hotel, was struck on the
head by a bottle which had apparently fallen or was thrown from
a window of the hotel by a guest who had rented a light housekeeping room there. It was shown that on several occasions
prior to the accident milk bottles, jars, and grapefruit had been
placed on the window sills by guests of the hotel and the hotel
had provided no guards on the windows to prevent such articles
from falling to the street. It was not shown, however, that the
hotel management knew their guests were in the habit of placing
on the window sills articles liable to fall. Plaintiff brought suit
against the defendant for his injuries. Held, the proprietor of a
hotel is not liable for injuries to third persons caused by a guest
throwing bottles out of the window, where. the proprietor had
no reason to anticipate such act and could not prevent it. The
proprietor is not required to inspect the window sills to see if
articles are placed there, nor is he required to contract with a
permanent guest against the latter's placing of articles on window sills, in order to be relieved of liability. Even a similar
act of a transient guest does hot render the proprietor liable
unless he knew or should have known of such acts and failed
to remedy the danger. There must be a causal connection between the fall of the objects and the acts of the hotelkeeper,
their servants, or persons for whose acts they are responsible.
Wolk v. PittsburghHotels Co., (Pa., 1925). 131 Atl. 537. A search
of the authorities discloses that the principal case is new in its
application of the rule that an innkeeper is not liable to strangers
for acts of his guests-where neither he nor his agents knew, or
by the exercise of reasonable care could have known, that the
manner and behavior of the guest were such as to indicate to a
man of average prudence that the guest might commit acts
which would naturally result in injury to others. The question
was first presented in a case appearing before the Kentucky Supreme Court in 1909. In that case a person in the street was in-
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jured by a bottle thrown into the street by a guest whose previous conduct had not been such as would charge the innkeeper
with knowledge or with reasonable grounds to believe that the
guest would be guilty of such conduct. In its decision the court
held that the innkeeper was not liable. Brunner v. Seelbach Hfotel
Co., (Ky., 1909) 133 Ky. 41, 117 S. W. 373, 19 Ann. Cas. 217.
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.--Wife Transacting Her Separate Business Not Chargeable With Fraud of Husband Who
Converted Money Paid by Wife ito Him in His Capacity as
Manager. Plaintiff transacting her own business contracted in
good faith, for certain lots with the defendant company through
their manager, plaintiff's husband, who fraudulently converted
part of the purchase money.
Defendant refused to convey and
plaintiff sought specific performance. Held, the wife, acting good
faith is not chargeable with her husband's fraud where he is defendant's agent. Plaintiff is therefore entitled to specific performance. Stolberg v. Oaknan, (Mich. 1925) 206 N. W. 488. The general rule that one who clothes an agent with apparent authority to
accept money is required to suffer loss where the agent misappropriates the funds, involved. Thomas v. Smith-Wagoner Co., (Ore.)
234 P. 814; Commonealth Finance Corp. v. Schutt (N. J.) 116 A.
722; Sioux City Cattle Loan Co., v. Lovrien (Ia.) 197 N. W. 914.
In this day when a wife has power to transact her own business,
if she deals with her husband as the agent of another it is only
reasonable to hold her free from any fraud on his part unless
she was a party to the fraud or acted in bad faith.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.&-Agreement to Convey Real
Estate for Care During Old Age. Plaintiffs filed a bill in equity
for specific performance against the admistrator and heirs of
their grandmother's sister who had made an oral agreement
with the plaintiffs that in consideration of their care and comfort
until death she would convey her property to them. Later
she died and plaintiffs after unsuccessful attempts to secure conveyance from the heirs, brought this bill. Hleld, where the grandniece and her husband undertook to care for decedent on her oral
agreement that she should convey her property to them, and they performed their part of the agreement, they were entitled to the
benefit of their contract, even though decedent died shortly after the
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agreement was made. Denevan v. Belter, (Mich. 1925) 206 N. W.
500. A contract to care for, give personal attention to, and make a
home for an aged person, whether relative or stranger, in return for
a promise of a testamentary gift, or devise, is a common form of an
agreement which will be enforced in equity, in the majority of the
courts, for the reason that the performance of services of this kind
is sufficient to take the contract out of the Statute of Frauds. Vreeland v. Vreeland, (N. J. Ch.) 32 AtI. 3. Where performance of the
agreement causes a hardship or change of position on the part of
the plaintiff his -equity is that much stronger. Best v. Gralapp,
(Nebr.) 99 N. W. 837. However, if the plaintiff should have been
in such circumstances prior to the agreement that in entering into
an agreement he would place himself in more advantageous circumstances it is no bar to relief. Berg v. Moreau, (Mo.) 97 S. W. 901.
It is not essential, according to some cases that performance of
the agreement should cause the plaintiff any sacrifice or pecuniary loss. See 36 Cyc. 674, Note 41.
TORTS-Interference With Business or Occupation.Plaintiff, a real estate broker, had the exclusive agency to sell a
certain building and interested one of the defendants in the property. His exclusive agency expired before he could complete
the sale but he continued negotiations under a general agency
and obtained from one of defendants-the prospective purchaser
-an offer which he submitted to the owner who was willing to
sell at that figure. The prospective purchaser was induced by
two others, one of whom acted as broker, and the other as the
nominal purchaser, to abandon the negotiations with plaintiff
and buy through them. The three conceived a plan whereby
they induced the owner to sell at a lower price reciting to him
that he would be relieved from paying the plaintiff's commission by dealing with them. The owner transferred the property; and plaintiff brought suit alleging that the defendants had
conspired to defraud him out of his commissions to which he
was entitled. Held, plaintiff, broker, who was deprived of the opportunity to complete negotiations by the fraudulent representations made to the owner by another broker, through whom the
sale was made, is entitled to recover damages from the broker,
the purported purchaser, and the real purchase as parties to the
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fraud. The law does not restrict protection to rights resting
on completed contracts only, but forbids unjustifiable interference with the right to pursue a lawful business or occupation and
secure earning of industry through fraud, misrepresentation, intimidation, obstruction, or molestation. Skene v. Carayanis (Conn.
1926) 131 A. 497. 'It may be stated in a general way that one who
uses misrepresentation, unfai-, or malicious simulated competition is
liable. Boggs v. Sluncan-Schell Furniture Co. (Iowa) 143 N. W.
482";So. Ry. Co. v. Chambers (Georgia) 55 S. E. 404; Tuttle v.
Buck (Minnesota) 119 N. W. 946. Where the owner of a vineyard
had listed with the plaintiff for sale and plaintiff, interested a purchaser who was about to buy, when defendants interfered by threats
and coercion and prevented the consummation of the deal, defendants are liable to plaintiff in damages. Krigbaumn v. Sbarboro (Cal.
App..) 138 P. 364. One cannot induce another to break a contract
with a third person to the damage of the latter. Citizen's Light and
Heat Co. v. Montgomery Light Co. (U. S. C. C. Ala.) 171 Federal
553; Cornellier v. Haverhill Mfr's Ass'n., (Mass.) 109 N. E. 643.
W. L.
T.

